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FEDERAL CLAIMS TO UNAPPROPRIATED WATERS
By

HON. CLIFFORD STONE,

Directorand Secretary, Colorado Water ConservationBoard, given

JUDGE

before the Association of Western State Engineers at Phoenix, Ariz.

STONE: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. According to the program my remarks shall be confined to a discussion of the paper entitled "Federal Claims to Unappropriated Waters" by Charles J. Bartholet. You have listened to a reading of that paper.
There appeared in the paper a resume of the claims of the
United States Government as set forth in the petition of intervention of the government in the case of Nebraska vs. Wyoming and Colorado. This suit is now pending in the United
States Supreme Court and was instituted for the purpose of
securing a judicial decree equitably apportioning the waters
of the North Platte River among the three states mentioned.
After the commencement of the suit the United States filed a
peition of intervention and was allowed by the court to intervene. On the principle that the government has federal investments on the river and should be permitted to protect its claim
to water necessary for the operation of structures built by the
government, such intervention was granted, but the claim that
the United States is the owner of all unappropriated waters
in the North Platte has not been passed upon by the court and
remains a question for adjudication in this litigation.
In order to understand the claim of the United States in
this case, which if sustained by the court, establishes a principle which would be applicable to all rivers in the West, some
of the specific statements of such claim contained in the petition
of intervention should be recited. These are:
"2.
France, Spain, and Mexico, by treaties with the United
States in 1803, 1819, and 1848, respectively, and Texas by agreement
with the United States in 1850, ceded to the United States territories
including the entire basin of the North Platte River.
"3.
By the aforesaid cessions the United States became the owner
of all lands and all rights in waters within the ceded territories with the
exception of lands and water rights which were privately owned at the
times of the cessions. There were no, or very few and limited, private
rights in the waters of the North Platte River at the times of the cessions.
'4. The rights of the United States in the waters of the North
Platte River did not pass to Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado upon
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their creation and admission to the Union, but remained in the United
States.
"5.
The United States has never, by Act of Congress or otherwise, abdicated or ceded away its rights in the waters of the North Platte
River except that by acquiescence in the local practices and by the Acts of
July 26, 1866 (14 Stat. 253), July 9, 1870 (16 Stat. 218), and
March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. 377), the United States adopted the practice
of permitting rights in the waters of the streams of the public domain
(including the North Platte River) to be acquired by private persons by
compliance with state and territorial law prescribing how rights in
waters could be acquired. From time to time private persons have, by
appropriation in compliance with the law of one of the litigant States,
acquired from the United States rights to use certain quantities of the
waters of the North Platte River, and from time to time the United
States, as is more specifically set forth hereinafter, has reserved waters of
the river for Federal reclamation projects. Waters so appropriated or
reserved were withdrawn from future appropriation, but rights in waters which have not been so appropriated or reserved are open to acquisition by private individuals as above described, all rights in such waters
remaining meanwhile in the United States."
"7.
For the purposes of the North Platte Project, as more particularly hereinafter described, the United States reserved and withdrew
from future appropriation certain quantities of the theretofore unappropriated waters of the North Platte River. Pursuant to Section 8 of the
Reclamation Act, and in order that an orderly system of priorities might
be maintained, the United States effected these reservations by procedure
substantially in conformity with the law of the State where the waters
were to be diverted as to the acquisition by appropriation of rights to the
use of water. In the case of waters to be diverted or stored in Wyoming
for use in Nebraska, the United States proceeded in conformity with the
law of Wyoming, and, as far as possible, with the law of Nebraska also."

The broad principle on which the government relies is
stated in the "Appendix to Motion on Behalf of the United
States for Leave to Intervene" as follows:
"* * * It is the contention of the United States that existing rights
to appropriate and use the waters of the non-navigable streams of the
public domain country are derived from the United States, either under
the acts of 1886, 1870, and 1877, or by tacit grants in the era preceding
those statutes; that these rights were granted by the United States, using
local customs and State and Territorial laws as subordinate instrumentalities only. It is the further contention of the United States that title
to all the water of the non-navigable streams of the public domain country which has not been granted away by the United States remains in
the United States."

In general the position of the states as indicated by reference to the "Objections to Intervention of the United States,"
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filed in the Supreme Court by Wyoming, is that the following
propositions have been established by decisions of the court:
"1. By the Act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. 377), if not before,
all unappropriated waters of non-navigable streams in the arid portions
of the public domain became property of the public subject to the plenary control of the states.
"2. There is no Federal statute authorizing the United States, or
any of its agencies, to make an appropriation of water except the Reclamation Act of 1902, and under that Act an appropriation of water may
be made by the Secretary of the Interior only in conformity with the
laws of the state or territory wherein the appropriation is made. The
Secretary of the Interior, as an appropriator of water, is in the same position as any other appropriator.
"3.
The United States is not the owner of unappropriated water
or of water rights under appropriations made by the Secretary of the
Interior, but such rights belong to the owners of the land upon which
the water is applied.
'4. The Congress in accepting, ratifying and confirming the Constitution of Wyoming agreed that the natural waters within its boundaries are the property of the State."

In explanation of the position of the United States, B. E.
Stoutmeyer, District Counsel of the U. S. Reclamation Service,
states in a letter to J. B. Fink, Director of the Department of
Conservation and Development, Olympia, Washington, as

follows:
"*
* * that the conditions which have made it necessary for the
United States to apply to the Supreme Court for permission to intervene
in the case of Nebraska v. Wyoming, are stated in the Government's
Petition to Intervene, and that the object of the Government's motion to
intervene is to be permitted to participate in the presentation of evidence
and argument in order to protect its extensive property and financial
interest in reclamation projects as well as to protect farmers and other
persons whose rights to water are derived from and dependant upon the
water rights claimed by the United States * * *
"The United States has asserted in its motion and petition that it
owns the waters of the North Platte River which it has appropriated for
its reclamation projects free from the 'sovereign supervision or control'
of the States. By that the United States means that the States have no
independent 'sovereign' control over the use by the United States of those
waters, but only such control as Congress has conferred upon them.
"It means that in the instance in which the Secretary is obliged to
comply with State law or is subject to State administrative control in
his conduct of the reclamation projects of the United States he is so
obliged or so subject by reason of Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, or
some other act of Congress, and not by reason of the inherent force of
State law or authority alone. The United States recognizes, of course,
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that Section 8 of the Reclamation Act provided that the Secretary, in carrying out that Act, shall comply with State law. All that the United
States contends is that the obligations upon the Secretary to follow State
law comes from this provision or from other federal statutes, and not
from the force of State law alone. As is explicitly stated on page 69 of
the Appendix, the United States is not seeking to have the Supreme Court
pass at this time upon the question whether the provision of Section 8
that the Secretary shall comply with State law is directly or mandatory. * * *

"It is the position of the Government in this case that water rights
are acquired by compliance with State laws and customs, not because the
State owns the unappropriated water but because the United States,
which does own the unappropriated water, has provided by Act of Congress that the rights thereto shall be secured by individual appropriators
by compliance with state law. It will be observed at once that this is a
rather theoretical difference as to the origin of water rights, rather than
any difference as to how the rights are acquired or the validity or indefeasibility of the rights when acquired. That is, both the attorneys for
the States and the Solicitor General, representing the United States, agree
that it is necessary to comply with State laws in acquiring water rights and
that rights so acquired are vested property rights and indefeasible. But
the Solicitor General contends that this is true because Congress so provided in the acts above quoted and that the water rights originally belonging to the United States thus became available for appropriation
under State law because Congress so provided and not because the States
have declared themselves to be the owners of such unappropriated waters.
The attorneys representing the States of Colorado and Wyoming, while
conceding that the United States originally owned all the unappropriated water, claim that the States have become the owners thereof either
because they declared themselves to be such owners in their state constitutions or for some other reason. This difference of opinion, however, as
to the origin of water rights does not involve any difference as to the
validity and effectiveness of water rights acquired by compliance with
state law nor any difference of opinion as to the authority of the state to
administer such vested rights as provided for in the state statute."

It will be observed that Mr. Stoutmeyer's statement evidences, as he admits, a theoretical difference of opinion as to
the origin of water rights. However, if the court should sustain the principle that the water rights become available for
appropriation under state laws because Congress so provided,
then these rights in the state are threatened because if these
rights were so granted by Congress, they can likewise be taken
away. On the other hand, if these rights are founded in the
constitutions of the several states as recognized and accepted by
the Congress, then they are secure. The principle claimed by
the government, if sustained by the Supreme Court, would lay
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a basis upon which the Congress may pass appropriate legislation revoking the grant to regulate and control the unappropriated waters of the streams of the West. If the position of
the states is sustained, then these rights are irrevocable. Constitutional provisions of the state, federal statutory enactments
and interpretations of the courts over a long period of time
have rendered these rights secure in the states; and the states
are not in a position where the water rights of its citizens and
the right to claim and appropriate water in the future is dependent upon a mere federal grant which may be revoked.
The government in recent years has established the policy
of control of power produced by federally-financed utilization
projects. Such projects are dependent upon a water supply.
If the government is attempting to establish a policy as to such
power through control of unappropriated water in the rivers
of the West, then irrigation development is submerged in order
to make more secure the government control over such power
devlopments. On the other hand, if the government in appropriating water under state laws is in the same position as any
citizen of a state, its rights arising no higher or no lower than
those of a citizen, then the security of the inhabitants of the
West in these water rights for all purposes is not jeopardized
and the government is adequately protected.
The ultimate legal question presented by the motion for
leave to intervene is whether the U. S. has an interest in the
subject matter of the litigation which the states are not competent to represent, or are not adequately representing, and
which, therefore, the U. S. is entitled to urge, as a party. The
motion sets forth two distinct interests of the U. S. which will
be affected by the litigation:
First, its interest in the appropriations of the waters of
the North Platte River which have been initiated by the U. S.
for federal reclamation projects; and, second, its claim to all
of the appropriated waters of that river.
The U. S. Supreme Court has heretofore ruled on the
motion of Wyoming to dismiss the complaint of Nebraska in
the instance case (Nebraska v. Wyoming and Colorado). One
ground in support of the request to dismiss was that the Secretary of the Interior was an indispensable party.
The court said (295 U. S. 40, 43):
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"The motion asserts that the Secretary of the Interior is an indispensable party. The bill alleges, and we know as matter of law, that
the Secretary and his agents, acting by authority of the Reclamation Act
and supplementary legislation, must obtain permits and priorities for the
use of water from the State of Wyoming in the same manner as a private
appropriator or an irrigation district formed under the state law. His
rights can rise no higher than those of Wyoming, and an adjudication
of the defendant's rights will necessarily bind him. Wyoming will stand
in judgment for him as for any other appropriator in that state. He is
not a necessary party."

There would seem to be no reasonable distinction between the Secretary of the Interior representing one of the
government departments and the United States appearing directly through the Attorney General. It follows then in view
of this decision of the court that where one of the litigant
states moved to dismiss because the Secretary of the Interior
was not a party, the court established the principle that the
Secretary must obtain permits and priorities for the use of
water from the State of Wyoming in the same manner as a
private appropriator or an irrigation district formed under the
state law; and that his rights can rise no higher than those of
Wyoming. Since the ownership in water is nothing more
than the right to use it, it would seem from this statement just
cited that such right can be acquired only through the state
government; and that claim to "ownership in all unappropriated water" is an empty phrase which has no bearing on the
substantial rights involved. Wiel in his work "Water Rights
in the Western States" (3rd Ed.), pp. 752-755, states:
"Because of its fugitive nature, the only property rights which exist

in water in its natural state, under either the riparian rights or the appropriation doctrine, are rights of use, the corpus being susceptible of
ownership only while in possession."

The principle set forth in the last quotation seems to be
accepted by the government. Such a principle taken in connection with the announcement of the Supreme Court (last
quoted above) shows that an academic discussion of the origin
of the states' rights lends no weight to a determination of the
question as to ownership in all unappropriated waters. The
assertion of ownership in all unappropriated water is a naked
claim if such ownership cannot be enjoyed except through recognition of the right to use such water by observance of state
laws and regulations.
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The farmer who places the water to a beneficial use is the
beneficiary. It is his use by observing all state laws and regulations which establishes the right. His exercise of this right
must be controlled by the same law which limits and establishes the rights of other water users out of the same stream.
A farmer under a federal reclamation project has no different
rights from those enjoyed by any other appropriator. If the
United States observes the state laws and regulations in appropriating the water, then it acts only as a carrier and distributor
of such water; it is in the position of trustee for the benefit of
those water users and is not acting in a governmental capacity.
Its rights in litigation are represented by the state.
The litigation over the waters of the North Platte in
which the government claims ownership to all unappropriated
water involves a determination of the proper division of the
flow of the stream as between the litigant states. If the United
States on a federal reclamation project owns all rights of appropriation free from the sovereign control of the states
through which the river flows (as is claimed by the government), then the principle of equitable apportionment is nullified so far as arid states are concerned. There remains, if this
claim of the government is correct, no basis upon which an
equitable apportionment of unappropriated water can be determined. The unappropriated water would not be apportioned on an equitable basis to the citizens of the litigant states,
but would go to water users under federal reclamation projects
constructed in the various states and a race between the states
to secure reclamation projects which would finally appropriate
all of the unappropriated flow of the stream and be substituted
for equity.
That the state represents all appropriators of water is
sustained in other Supreme Court cases. In Kansas v. Colorado, 206, U. S.46, as follows:
"While several of the defendant corporations have answered it is
unnecessary to specially consider their defenses, for, if the case against
Colorado fails, it fails also as against them."

The court held in Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U. S.494,
508, as follows:
"But it is said that water claims other than the tunnel appropriation could not be and were not affected by the decree, because the claim-
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ants were not parties to the suit or represented therein. In this the nature
of the suit is misconceived. It was one between states, each acting as a
quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests and rights of her people in a controversy with the other. Counsel for Colorado insisted in
their brief in that suit that the controversy was 'not between private parties' but 'between the two sovereignties of Wyoming and Colorado;' and
this court in its opinion assented to that view, but observed that the
controversy was one of immediate and deep concern to both states and
that the interests of each were indissolubly linked with those of her
appropriators. 259 U. S. 468. Decisions in other cases also warrant
the conclusion that the water claimants in Colorado, and those in Wyoming, were represented by their respective States and are bound by the
decree."

Since the court in the Nebraska case has permitted the
United States to intervene without opinion and without passing upon the government's claim to all of the unappropriated
waters of the North Platte, and in view of the decisions above
cited, it is logical to assume that the court recognized the interest of the government as appropriator for the actual users and
as an investor on the river and by such permission to intervene
made provision for the government being adequately represented in the proceedings. There is no indication that such
intervention was permitted on the basis that the government
is recognized as owning and in control of all unappropriated
waters to the exclusion of what we believe to be the well-recognized rights in the states; but pending this litigation and
before the final decree is entered in the case it is necessary that
the states defend their rights to control the use and appropriation of water, which is tantamount to ownership.
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902 (C.
1093, 32 Stat. 388), provides as follows:
"Sec. 8. That nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting
or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State
or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution
of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and
the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act,
shall proceed in conformity with such laws, * * *"

Respecting this federal provision, the Solicitor General
of the United States in his brief states:
"*
* * As made clear in the Appendix to the Motion of the
United States (pp. 68, 69), no question is here at issue concerning the
authority or present applicability of Section 8 of the Reclamation Act.
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That section, it may be assumed, requires exact conformity with State
law in the administration of the Reclamation Act, save as Congress has
otherwise expressly directed. * * *"

The government's interpretation of this clause is most
interesting when we note the following:
"What is solely important is that if the existing exceptions to the
requirement of conformity are valid, and if Congress has power further
to depart from that requirement in the future, then the rights of the U. S.
in the waters appropriated for federal reclamation projects do not fall in
the same category as do the rights of private appropriators. * * *"

It will be observed that the position of the United States,
as disclosed by the above statements. is that the Congress in
passing the Reclamation Act of 1902 consented to a conformity of state laws in the administration of water rights and the
control of waters appropriated for reclamation projects, but
that Congress has power "further to depart from that requirement in the future," and that, therefore, the rights of the
United States fall in a different category from that of private
appropriators. In other words, the government takes the position that this provision represents a mere acquiescence by
Congress in the control by the states of the water rights, with
implied reservation to revoke any such law, and that future
federal legislation may provide for taking water for federal
projects free from the sovereignty of the states and in utter disregard of these rights as they have been recognized in the past.
This position goes further than the statement contained in
Stoutmeyer's letter, a portion of which is above quoted. He
states that:
"Both the attorneys for the states and the Solicitor General representing the United States agree that it is necessary to comply with state
laws in acquiring water rights and that rights so acquired are vested
property rights and indefeasible."

The proper interpretation of the Reclamation Act and
other federal legislative provisions respecting this subject
would seem to be that the Congress in passing the Act did not
merely acquiesce in the state laws, but on the contrary recognized the rights of the states to control the appropriation and
use of water for irrigation and other purposes. In other words,
there has been a deliberate congressional intent to recognize
these states' rights. Such recognition has ample foundation in
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the customs, constitutions of the several states, and constitutional interpretations by decisions of the federal and state
courts. Reference is made in the government brief to the Acts
of 1866 (14 Stat. 253), 1870 (16 Stat. 218), 1877 (19 Stat.
377). In the last cited statute, after providing that a claimant's right to the use of water depends upon bona fide prior
appropriation, it is expressly stated that:
* * all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation
and use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of
water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and
be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation,
mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights."
"*

Sections 5 and 6 of Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution provides as follows:

"Sec. 5. Water, Public Property: The water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is
hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the State, subject to appropriation as
hereinafter provided."
"Sec. 6. Diverting unappropriated water: Priority: The right to
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better
right as between those using the water for the same purpose; but when
the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all
those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic
purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other
purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have
preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes."

Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
passing upon the federal acts above cited have supported the
principle of dedication of the waters of nonnavigable streams
to the public for appropriation and use under state laws.
In California, Oregon Power Company v. Beaver Portland Cement Company, 295 U. S. 142, the Court holds that
the effect of the Desert Land Act was to sever the water from
the land and that a grantee in a patent would only take (295
U. S. 162) :
"the legal title to the land conveyed, and such title and only such
title, to the flowing waters thereon as shall be fixed or acknowledged
by the customs, laws, and judicial decisions of the state of their location."

The Court further held that the nonnavigable waters on
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the public domain became "publici juris, subject to the plenary
control" of the states, in language as follows:
"What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before
all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became
publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states * * *
with the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of
appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights
should obtain."

In Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82, the Court held:
"Although the Government diverted, stored and distributed the
water, the contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water
or water rights became vested in the United States is not well founded.
Appropriation was made not for the use of the Government, but, under
the Reclamation Act, for the use of the landoWners; and by the terms
of the law and of the contract already referred to, the water rights became the property of the landowniers, wholly distinct from the property
right of the government in the irrigation works. * * * The Government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the water
* * * , with the right to receive the sums stipulated in the contracts as
reimbursement for the cost of construction and annual charges for operation and maintenance of the works. As security therefore, it was provided that the government should have a lien upon the lands and the
water rights appurtenant thereto-a provision which in itself imports
that the water rights belong to another than the lienor, that is to say,
to the landowner."

Referring to the Desert Land Act in this same decision
the following language was used:
"Acquisition of the government title to a parcel of land was not
to carry with it a water right; but all nonnavigable waters were reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the various arid-land
states."
Provisions similar to those contained in the Colorado
Constitution, above quoted, are embodied in the Constitutions
of Wyoming and other irrigated land states and these constistitutions in one form or another have been approved by the
National Congress.
It is, therefore, clear that by the Reclamation Act of 1902
and other federal enactments, the Congress has recognized the
well established principle that the water of nonnavigable
streams is dedicated to the public for appropriation and use
under the state laws; and may I repeat that because of the
fugitive nature of water the control, under state laws, of its
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appropriation and use is tantamount to ownership and the
academic discussions by the Government of the origin of these
rights is without legal force.
QUINN: Thank you, Judge Stone, for such an able
discussion on the subject of the Federal claim. We yet have a
little time for discussion from the floor.
MR. HYATT: Judge Stone, do you know the reason for
this particular position taken by the Attorney General? I
haven't heard those letters you referred to. Would like to ask
what position you recommend this Association to take, if
any? This Association is very much interested in this subject.
Do you advise a resolution advocating attitude of the various
states?
STONE: In answer to your question, the matter may be
approached in two ways; namely: First, by passing an appropriate resolution expressing the views of this association;
and, second, the several arid states interested in this matter
may find it advisable to file briefs in the pending litigation on
the North Platte as friends of the Court, and in such briefs
cover only the opposition to the position of the Government
that it owns all unappropriated water in the nonnavigable
streams of the West. The states probably do not have such an
interest in the pending litigation that a petition of intervention
would be entertained by the Court.
MR. HYATT: Judge Stone, in submitting a brief would
it be necessary for a state to submit the matter to the legislature?
STONE: Probably I should not attempt to answer that
question, but may I suggest that in one state it was the Attorney General's suggestion that the matter was of sufficient importance that the legislature should be asked to authorize the
filing of the brief covering the question in the Supreme Court
and make sufficient appropriation for such purpose.
MR. MCCLURE: There is a question of upholding constitutional rights of Wyoming and Colorado; also rights that
exist under the Reclamation Act. In granting authority to
certain federal agencies to appropriate water under state laws
that are in operation, what effect would that have on federal
agencies that have in the last year secured statutes to go ahead
and make use of waters?
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There might be some infringement on water rights
claimed by another federal agency not tied down definitely
under Congressional acts. We should see to it that all water
development of any kind by a federal agency recognizes the
state laws. In the final analysis the welfare of the states and
those who sell water under these projects require the state laws,
rules and regulations are followed and I believe that can be
brought about by the Court.
HUMPHREYS: I would like to ask Judge Stone whether
or not the states of Wyoming and Colorado and several others
attempted to influence the Attorney General to such an extent
that he did go forward with your request and change his position in face of intervention. Perhaps this is a dangerous time
to pass resolutions. Perhaps we should rely on the papers
which are now on file in the Supreme Court of the United
States. These letters, I believe, are the immediate results of
pressure-pressure not sufficient to withdraw its claim if any
water is open for adjudication under it. I believe the Reclamation Bureau regrets that this position was ever taken. The
Reclamation Bureau has cooperated with these states in the
matter of water rights and reclamation projects for construction.
STONE:
The Attorney General of the three states of
Nebraska, Wyoming and Colorado consulted with the Solicitor General and other federal officials on this matter. I shall
not attempt to set forth those discussions but it is clear that
after they were had the Government in the last briefs filed in
the case continued to claim ownership in all unappropriated
water of the North Platte.
CRAMER:
I have been connected with the federal government for a long time. In our department we are required
before licensed to use water to see that the licensee complies
with the state laws and determine what is the most important
use of the water, whether essential to irrigation or domestic
uses.

